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NOTES
UNREPORTED DECISIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
It is a maxim among these lawyers, that whatever hath been
done before may legally be done again: and therefore they take
special care to record all the decisions formerly made against
common justice and the general reason of mankind. These,
under the name of precedents, they produce as authorities, to
justify the most iniquitous opinions; and the judges never fail of
directing accordingly.'
The geometric increase in the number of cases before the
United States courts of appeals during the past decade has necessi-
tated the development of methods for increasing judicial effi-
ciency.2 In 1972, the Judicial Conference of the United States,
acting on the recommendation of the Board of the Federal Judi-
cial Center, requested each circuit court to develop a plan for
publication of opinions.3 In response to this request, each circuit
has developed procedures for disposing without published opin-
ion of cases that present no significant precedent and are not of
general public interest.4 These procedures result in a significant
body of decisions not easily accessible to the public or the bar.5
IJ. Swi'r, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS 283 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1950) (emphasis in original).
2 Caseloads for all the circuit courts totaled 3,899 in 1960 and 6,548 in 1966. Shafroth,
Survey of the United States Courts of Appeals, 42 F.R.D. 243, 263 (1967). By 1975, the
caseloads totaled 10,125. J. Spaniol, Report on the Operation of Circuit Opinion Publica-
tion Plans 2 (Dec. 31, 1975) (Memorandum to the Subcommittee on Federal Jurisdiction of
the Judicial Conference of the United States) (on file at the Cornell Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as 1975 Publication Plans Report].
3 Hearings Before the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, vol. 1, at
520 (1974) (statement of Sprecher, J.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. The recommenda-
tions of the Judicial Conference were based on a time study of the judges of the Third
Circuit showing that the appellate judges spend 48% of their time preparing opinions. Id.
at 519. See also 1975 Publication Plans Report, supra note 2, at 1.
4 See 1ST CIR. R. 14; 2D CIR. R. 0.23; 3d Cir. Plan for Publication of Opinions, reprinted
in 1975 Publication Plans Report, supra note 2, at app. C; 4TH CIR. R. 18; 5TH CIR. R. 21;
6TH CIR. R. 11; 7TH CIR. R. 35; 8TH CIR. R. 14; 9TH Cim. R. 21; 10TH CIR. R. 17; D.C.
CIR. R. 13(c).
5 Written but unpublished opinions are available from the clerks of the various courts
of appeals on the same basis and at the same cost as other slip decisions. In the first 11
months of 1975, the number of cases disposed of by each of the circuits without published
opinion was: 1st Cir., 203; 2d Cir., 322; 3d Cir., 417; 4th Cir., 839; 5th Cir., 876; 6th Cir.,
563; 7th Cir., 365; 8th Cir., 191; 9th Cir., 1,389; 10th Cir., 433; D.C. Cir., 186. The total
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In developing rules for unreported decisions, the circuits
have disagreed over two basic questions. First, should a written
disposition be made of every case?6 Second, should precedential
value be accorded unreported decisions; .that is, may counsel in
subsequent cases cite unreported opinions to the courts that is-
sued them or to lower courts within the same circuit or courts of
other circuits? 7 Unreported appellate decisions raise significant
problems. Reported appellate decisions bind district courts within
that circuit, and act as persuasive authority to sister circuits and
district courts in other circuits; unreported decisions generally do
not.8 In addition, inconsistent decisions by different panels within
a circuit, or conflicts among or between circuits, may go unde-
tected and unresolved.
I
To REPORT OR NOT To REPORT: A SURVEY
OF THE CIRCUITS
The circuits' rules for disposing of cases without reported de-
cision differ in procedure and degree of specificity. Although
they do not admit of easy categorization, it is possible to identify
common and divergent characteristics.
The Fifth Circuit implemented the most radical approach in
promulgating its Local Rule 21. 9 Under this rule, the Fifth Circuit
can affirm or enforce a judgment or order without opinion if it
finds:
for all circuits was 5,784. 1975 Publication Plans Report, supra note 2, at app. A. For the
first 11 months of 1976 the figures were: 1st Cir., 103; 2d Cir., 511; 3d Cir., 597; 4th Cir.,
586; 5th Cir., 902; 6th Cir., 636; 7th Cir., 385; 8th Cir., 152; 9th Cir., 1,401; 10th Cir.,
954; D.C. Cir., 224. The total for all circuits was 6,451. J. Spaniol, Operation of Circuit
Opinion Publication Plans During the Eleven-month Period Ending November 30, 1976, at
app. A (Dec. 23, 1976) (Memorandum to the Subcommittee on Federal Jurisdiction of the
Judicial Conference of the United States) (on file at the Cornell Law Review) [hereinafter
cited as 1976 Publication Plans Report].
6 Compare 4TH Cm. R. 18 with 2D CIR. R. 0.23. See also 1976 Publication Plans Report,
supra note 5, at app. A; 1975 Publication Plans Report, supra note 2, at app. A.
7 Compare 7 TH CIR. R. 35(b)(2)(iv) and 9TH CIR. R. 21(c) with 10TH CIR. R. 17(c).
8 Although unreported district court decisions constitute a substantial body of federal
law, they do not present many of the problems raised by unreported appellate decisions.
Unreported district court decisions do not constitute binding authority. Moreover, no court
prohibits the citation of unreported district court decisions.
9 5TH CIR. R. 21 (promulgated July 1, 1970). These procedures have been adopted by
the Eighth Circuit and incorporated into the Tenth Circuit's approach. See text accompany-
ing notes 32-34 infra.
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(1) that a judgment of the district court is based on findings of
fact which are not clearly erroneous; (2) that the evidence in
support of a jury verdict is not insufficient; (3) that the order of
an administrative agency is supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole; (4) that no error of law appears; and
the court also determines that an opinion would have no prece-
dential value .... 10
As a result, the circuit court can decide many of its cases without
issuing any opinion whatsoever. The rule's most distinguishing
characteristic is that the ratio decidendi is not made known even to
the parties themselves. Not only is no opinion reported, none is
even authored. This may explain why the court in NLRB v. Amal-
gamated Clothing Workers Local 99011 offered a more explicit
rationalization of its rule than has any other circuit.12 Ironically,
that decision admits:
Opinions ... serve a number of purposes at least two of which
are highly significant. One is that an articulated discussion of the
factors, legal, factual, or both, which lead the Court to one rather
than another result, gives strength to the system, and reduces...
the easy temptation or tendency to ill-considered or even arbi-
trary action by those having the awesome power of almost final
review. The second . . .is that the very discursive statement of
these articulated reasons is the thing out of which law-and par-
ticularly Judge-made law-grows. 13
'0 5TH CIR. R. 21. This rule requires the court to find that one of the four enumerated
criteria have been met and that an opinion would have no precedential value. In such cases
the court's opinion reads in total: "AFFIRMED [or ENFORCED]. See Local Rule 21." Id.
"430 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1970).
Announcing the rule under which almost 25% of its cases are decided, the court
justified it as "another response of this Court to the ever-growing explosive increase in the
amount of its judicial business" (id. at 968), specifically, "an increase of 168% for appeals in
the period 1961-1969" (id. at 970). To deal with this increasing caseload, the court felt the
need "to exercise imaginative, inventive resourcefulness in fashioning new methods . .. to
enable [it] to at least stay abreast of this flood tide." Id. Although the Fifth Circuit rule
provides only for disposition without opinion of cases that are "affirmed" or "enforced,"
the court has also reversed the lower courts without opinion in certain circumstances. See,
e.g., Hall v. United States, 524 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1975); Dasher v. Housing Authority, 524
F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1975), vacating and remanding 64 F.R.D. 720 (N.D. Ga. 1974). Such
actions clearly violate the express terms of Local Rule 21. See note 10 and accompanying
text supra. In addition, the Dasher case raises the problem of unreported reversals of previ-
ously reported opinions. Since only the lower court's initial disposition is freely available,
future litigants wishing to cite that case will be unaware of the grounds on which it was
overruled.
13 430 F.2d at 972.
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The court also cautioned "that it must-the word is must-never
apply the Rule to avoid making a difficult or troublesome decision
or to conceal divisive or disturbing issues."'14
The approach of the Ninth Circuit-the nation's second
busiest' 5 -contrasts with the approach of the Fifth Circuit-the
nation's busiest.' 6 The Ninth Circuit's rule provides three classi-
fications for written dispositions by the court: "Opinions," "Mem-
oranda," and "Orders. 1' 7 An opinion is "[a] written reasoned dis-
position of a case which is intended for publication."' A mem-
orandum is "[a] written reasoned disposition of a case which is
not intended for publication."'' 9 All other dispositions are orders.20
A case does not qualify for disposition by published opinion unless
it:
(1) Establishes, alters, modifies or clarifies a rule of law, or
(2) Calls attention to a rule of law which appears to have been
generally overlooked, or
(3) Criticizes existing law, or
(4) Involves a legal or factual issue of unique interest or substan-
tial public importance, or
(5) Relies in whole or in part upon a reported opinion in the
case by a district court or an administrative agency, or
(6) Is accompanied by a separate concurring or dissenting ex-
pression, and the author of such separate expression desires that
it be reported .... 21
In addition, the rule (a) provides a mechanism for requesting pub-
141d.
15 The Ninth Circuit recorded 2,293 dispositions during the first 11 months of 1975
and 2,395 dispositions during the same period of 1976. 1976 Publication Plans Report,
supra note 5, at app. B (9th Cir.); 1975 Publication Plans Report, supra note 2, at app. B
(9th Cir.).
16 The Fifth Circuit recorded 2,884 dispositions in the first 11 months of 1975 and
2,909 in the first 11 months of 1976. Of these, 692 and 590 respectively were without
opinion pursuant to Local Rule 21. The court also decided 215 cases in 1975 and 337 in
1976 by written opinions that were not published, even though its rules do not specifically
provide for such disposition. 1976 Publication Plans Report, supra note 5, at app. B (5th
Cir.); 1975 Publication Plans Report, supra note 2, at app. B (5th Cir.).
17 9TH CIR. R. 21(a).
18 Id.
19 Id. (emphasis added).
2 0 Id. No dispositions by order were recorded in the first 11 months of 1975 or 1976.
1976 Publication Plans Report, supra note 5, at app. B (9th Cir.); 1975 Publication Plans
Report, supra note 2, at app. B (9th Cir.).
21 9TH CIR. R. 21(b).
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lication of a previously unreported decision; 22 (b) enables a major-
ity of judges on a panel to designate for publication a previously
unpublished disposition; 23 and (c) suggests that the determination
as to publication be made at the first conference following oral
argument.2 4 Such explicit guidelines encourage uniformity among
different panels of a circuit in their determinations regarding pub-
lication.
The Ninth Circuit's language creates a presumption against
publication-a case must meet the articulated criteria to qualify for
publication. The language of the Fifth Circuit, by contrast, favors
publication-a case must meet one of the specified tests of Local
Rule 21 to qualify for disposition without written opinion, and
almost all written opinions are published.25 The percentage of
cases decided but not reported bears out these conflicting pre-
sumptions. n
The First Circuit's approach displays an attitude more philo-
sophical than functional: "Our test, broadly phrased, is whether
the district courts, future litigants, or we ourselves would be likely
to benefit from the opportunity to read or cite the opinion ....
The Third, 28 Fourth,29 Sixth,30 and Seventh 3 1 Circuits have also
"Id. R. 21(f):
Request for Publication. Publication of any unpublished disposition may be re-
quested by letter addressed to the Clerk, stating concisely the reasons for publica-
tion. Such a request will not be entertained unless received within 60 days of the
issuance of this court's disposition.
13Id. R. 21(d):
Designation for Publication. A disposition other than an opinion may be spe-
cially designated for publication by a majority of the judges acting and when so
published may be used for any purpose for which an opinion may be used. Such a
designation should be indicated at the end of the disposition when filed with the
Clerk by the addition of the words "For Publication" on a separate line.
241d. R. 21(e).
2" See notes 9-14, 16, and accompanying text supra,
26 In 1975 the Fifth Circuit decided 2,884 cases, 30% of which were not reported.
That same year, the Ninth Circuit decided 2,293 cases, 61% of those unreported. 1975
Publication Plans Report, supra note 2, at app. A. In 1976, the Fifth Circuit decided 2,909
cases, 32% of them unreported. The Ninth Circuit figures for that year are 2,395 and 58%
respectively. 1976 Publication Plans Report, supra note 5, at app. A.
27 lsw CiR. R. app. B. See also lsT CIR. R. 14, which indicates that absence of a full
written opinion means "no new points of law, making the decision of general precedential
value, are believed to be involved."
11 The Third Circuit's Plan for Publication of Opinions has not been adopted as part of
its local rules. The plan creates a presumption that signed opinions shall be published and
that per curiam opinions shall not. The decision on publication is made by a majority of
the panel hearing the case. The plan states that "there should be publication only where
the case has precedental [sic] or institutional value." 1975 Publication Plans Report, supra
note 2, at app. C.
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developed procedures for designating certain opinions as "not for
publication." The Eighth Circuit has adopted verbatim the Fifth
2'9 4TH CIR. R. 18 adopts criteria almost identical to those of the Ninth Circuit. This
rule, like the Ninth Circuit rule, presumes nonpublication unless one of six standards is
met:
(i) It establishes, alters, modifies, clarifies, or explains a rule of law within this
circuit; or
(ii) It involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or
(iii) It criticizes existing law; or
(iv) It contains an historical review of a legal rule that is not duplicative; or
(v) It resolves a conflict between panels of this court, or creates a conflict with a
decision in another circuit; or
(vi) It is in a case in which there is a published opinion below.
Id. The Fourth Circuit rule does not include any of the procedural detail incorporated in
9TH CIR. R. 21. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
11 6TH CIR. R. 11 merely acknowledges that certain decisions will be "designated as not
for publication." It specifies no criteria for the determination on publication. In 1975 only
26 opinions were not published. 1975 Publication Plans Report, supra note 2, at app. B (6th
Cir.).
31 7 TH CIR. R. 35 is among the most specific. It divides decisions into "opinions" and
"orders." Opinions are published, orders are not. The rule even indicates how opinions
and orders are to be printed and to whom they are to be circulated.
(1) Published opinions:
Shall be filed in signed or per curiam form in appeals which
(i) Establish a new or change an existing rule of law;
(ii) Involve an issue of continuing public interest;
(iii) Criticize or question existing law;
(iv) Constitute a significant and non-duplicative contribution to legal litera-
ture
(A) by a historical review of law;
(B) by describing legislative history; or
(C) by resolving or creating a conflict in the law; or
(v) Reverse a judgment or deny enforcement of an order when the lower
court or agency has published an opinion supporting the order.
(2) Unpublished orders:
(i) May be filed after an oral statement of reasons has been given from the
bench and may include only, or little more than, the judgment rendered
in appeals which
(A) are frivolous or
(B) present no question sufficiently substantial to require explanation of
the reasons for the action taken, such as where
(aa) a controlling statute or decision determines the appeal;
(bb) issues are factual only and judgment appealed from is sup-
ported by evidence;
(cc) order appealed from is nonappealable or this court lacks juris-
diction or appellant lacks standing to sue; or
(ii) May contain reasons for the judgment but ordinarily not a complete nor
necessarily any statement of the facts, in appeals which
(A) are not frivolous but
(B) present arguments concerning the application of recognized rules of
law, which are sufficiently substantial to warrant explanation but are
not of general interest or importance.
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Circuit's rule.32 The Tenth Circuit has followed the Fifth Circuit's
summary affirmance or enforcement procedure, 33 but also allows
for written opinions which, although available to the parties, will
not be published. 34 The District of Columbia Circuit's rule is the
most cryptic. It permits the court to "dispense with opinions where
the issues occasion no need therefor, and confine its action to such
abbreviated disposition as it may deem appropriate."3 5 Alone
among the circuits, the Second Circuit writes no unreported opin-
ions. 36 Its rules, however, allow for "disposition . in open court
or by summary order. '37
Affirmance without order, as per the rules of the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits, 38 should be abolished. In a survey of the bar, con-
ducted at the court's request, attorneys of the Seventh Circuit indi-
cated their concern that some form of opinion be written in every
case. 39 A brief explanation of an appellate court's action-be it an
Id. R. 35(c). The Seventh Circuit also specifies means of printing and scope of distribution
of published and unpublished dispositions. Id. R. 35(b).
32 8TH CIR. R. 14. The Fifth Circuit rule is set out in the text accompanying note 10
supra.33 10TH CIR. R. 17(b).
3 4 1d. R. 17(d):
Situations where publication shall occur include (1) conflicts with decisions of
the Tenth Circuit or other federal appellate courts; the interpretation of decisions
of the highest court of a state or the Supreme Court of the United States; (2) new
federal constitutional or statutory issues; and (3) diversity cases in which a new or
unique proposition of law is expounded.
Id. R. 17(e):
Situations where publication should not occur include (1) cases where the out-
come depends on facts and presents no legal issues not previously decided by the
Tenth Circuit or by the Supreme Court of the United States; and (2) diversity
cases where the outcome depends on established state law.
The rule also provides that where the lower court or agency decision is published, the
appellate decision shall also be published. If the appellate decision would not ordinarily
meet the criteria for publication, "only the dispositive judgment or order of the court"
shall be published. Id. R. 17(f).
15 D.C. CIR. R. 13(c). In practice, the D.C. Circuit has decided about 25% of its cases
without published opinion, 35% of these by unpublished memoranda and 65% by order.
See 1976 Publication Plans Report, supra note 5, at app. B (D.C. Cir.); 1975 Publication
Plans Report, supra note 2, at app. B (D.C. Cir.).
36 See 1976 Publication Plans Report, supra note 5, at app. A; 1975 Publication Plans
Report, supra note 2, at app. A.
37 2ND CIR. R. 0.23. This rule-unique among the circuits-requires unanimity of the
panel in favor of such disposition, and requires a determination that "each judge of the
panel believes that no jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion." Id.
11 5TH CIR. R. 21; 8TH CIR. R. 14. See notes 9-14, 32, and accompanying text supra.
39 See Hearings, vol. 1, supra note 3, at 465-69; Report of the Chicago Bar Association Com-
mittee on Appellate Court Congestion, 56 CHI. B. REc. 16, 20-21 (1974).
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indication of reliance on the lower court opinion or an indication
that an earlier decision of that same court is considered dispositive
of the issues presented-would serve two worthy goals. On review
to the Supreme Court, it would indicate the underlying rationale of
the decision below. 40 In addition, it would assure the litigants-and
particularly the losing litigants-that their case has been given the
consideration it deserves. Brief explanations of the decisions in all
cases would require little additional judicial effort. If the appeal
turns on issues of fact, and the circuit court finds that the verdict is
based on sufficient evidence or that the findings of the lower court
are not clearly erroneous, the circuit court can say so, without
examining the case in detail. If the appeal is frivolous, a notation
to that effect by the circuit court may discourage future litigants
in similar situations from seeking review and cluttering already
crowded dockets.
II
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE: POLICIES AND PRACTICES
All circuit courts addressing the issue accord unreported deci-
sions something less than the full precedential weight of reported
opinions. Several circuits have either specifically indicated or
clearly implied that unreported opinions are not precedent and
may not be cited by or to the courts of that circuit.41 The Fourth
Circuit disfavors, but does not ban, the citation of unpublished
opinions.42 The Seventh Circuit requires a litigant to appear before
the court and have an unreported decision certified for publication
before it can be cited. 43 The Tenth Circuit sanctions the citation of
unreported cases with the proviso that a copy of any unreported
decision cited must be served on opposing counsel.44 Four circuits
are silent on the precedential value of, and counsel's ability to cite,
unreported decisions. 43 These practices raise several problems.
40 See Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 193-94 (1972).
41 1ST CIR. R. 14; 2ND CmR. R. 0.23; 6TH CIR. R. 11; 7TH CIR. R. 35(b)(2)(iv); 9TH CIR.
R. 21(c).
42 4TH Cm. R. 18(d).
43 7TH Cm. R. 35(b)(2)(iv).
44 10TH CIR. R. 17(c). The Tenth Circuit has attributed the success of its rule to the
policy of permitting citation of unreported cases. 1976 Publication Plans Report, supra note
5, at app. D (10th Cir.).
4' The Third, Fifth, Eighth, and District of Columbia Circuits have not promulgated
rules on these issues.
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A. Unreported Cases Establishing or Clarifying the Law
Citation of unreported decisions becomes essential when the
opinions establish or clarify the law in the circuit. A series of
Fourth Circuit cases exemplifies the problem. In Jones v. Superin-
tendent,46 that court conceded that
any decision is by definition a precedent, and.., we cannot deny
litigants and the bar the right to urge upon us what we have
previously done. But because memorandum decisions are not
prepared with the assistance of the bar, we think it reasonable to
refuse to treat them as precedent within the meaning of the rule
of stare decisis. We prefer that they not be cited to us for an
additional reason: since they are unpublished and generally un-
available to the bar, access to them is unequal and depends upon
chance rather than research. For this reason, also, we will not
ourselves in published opinions cite or refer to memorandum
decisions. 47
Although this policy allows counsel and the district courts to
cite unpublished cases, it has not clarified the extent to which liti-
gants may rely on unreported circuit court holdings as precedent. 48
For example, in March 1971, the Eastern District of Virginia de-
cided Marston v. Oliver49 (Marston I), holding that accused indigent
misdemeanants are constitutionally entitled to counsel. In June
1972, the United States Supreme Court reached the same conclu-
sion in Argersinger v. Hamlin.50 The Fourth Circuit affirmed Mars-
ton I the following November in an unreported decision (Marston
II),"1 giving retroactive effect to the holding of Argersinger. In De-
46 465 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1972).
4 7Id. at 1094.
48 See, e.g., Curley v. Bryan, 362 F. Supp. 48 (D.S.C. 1973). In Curley the district court
was faced with an issue which had been recently decided by the Fourth Circuit in an
unpublished memorandum decision (Gatling v. Midgett, No. 70-14,863 (4th Cir. June 9,
1971)). The district court, in its published opinion, quotes and relies on the Gatling deci-
sion. In so doing, the court added this footnote:
The court cites Gatling... with some trepidation. In [Jones] the court [of appeals]
held that memorandum decisions need not be afforded precedential value ....
But this court is aware of no other decision of the Fourth Circuit which is as much
on all fours with the instant case as Gatling, and to this court's knowledge the
principle of estoppel enunciated in Gatling has not been subsequently overturned
by any reported decision.
362 F. Supp. at 52 n.2.
49 324 F. Supp. 691 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 485 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 936 (1974).
50 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
51 No. 71-1329 (4th Cir. Nov. 7, 1972).
[Vol. 63:128
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cember 1972, the same district judge who had decided Marston I
had before him Herndon v. Superintendent.52 That case also involved
an accused misdemeanant's right to counsel, but since the trial of
Herndon occurred before Argersinger was handed down, the case cen-
tered on whether Argersinger applied retroactively. Although the
Fourth Circuit had answered the retroactivity question affirma-
tively in Marston II, the respondent in Herndon argued that "Mars-
ton [II] . . .was promulgated in a memorandum decision of the
Court [of Appeals] and thus carries little precedential weight."53
The court responded:
[This] contention gains some support from the Court of Appeals'
own language in Uones] .... Nevertheless, this Court is duty
bound to follow the rules enunciated by its appellate court. Ab-
sent contrary holdings in the Court of Appeals' published deci-
sions, this Court will continue to give the appropriate weight to
the memorandum decisions of the Court of Appeals, regardless
of form. To do otherwise would place the Court in the untenable
position of looking to the format of the decision rather than to
the ultimate fact that the decision is signed by three learned
judges of the Court.54
The matter did not rest there, however, because in October 1973
the same issue arose before the Western District of Virginia in Mays
v. Harris.55 The court also relied on the unreported Marston II
decision:
The court is fully aware that our Court of Appeals has indicated
that memorandum decisions.., are of limited precedential value
[quoting Jones]. . . .Nevertheless, this court feels obligated to
adhere to the principle enunciated in Marston [II] .... [I]t is the
only available indicator of the Fourth Circuit's position on [this]
question .... Additionally, the problem of inequality is elimi-
nated because both parties were made aware of the Marston [III]
decision. See Herndon v. Superintendent .... 56
Thus, the Mays court based its decision, at least in part, on the fact
that publication of the Herndon district court opinion had adver-
tised the Fourth Circuit's unpublished Marston II decision. Ironi-
52 351 F. Supp. 1356 (E.D. Va. 1972).
53 1d. at 1358.
54 Id.
55 369 F. Supp. 1348 (W.D. Va. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 523 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir.
1975).
56 d. at 1350-51 n.1 (citation omitted).
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cally, eight days after the Mays decision the Fourth Circuit pub-
lished an opinion reversing Marston I, apparently on rehearing 57
True to its own policy, the court did not mention the 1972 unre-
ported decision in the same case.
In Mohr v. Jordan,58 the district court cited and relied upon
three separate unreported Fourth Circuit decisions, 59 each holding
that the time a defendant spends in jail awaiting trial must be
credited against the sentence imposed. After noting the Jones deci-
sion, the court stated:
[H]ere there are three separate Memorandum Decisions in three
different cases, and each of the seven active Judges of the Fourth
Circuit has participated in one or more of these decisions ....
Accordingly, this Court concludes that the law is established in
this Circuit that a prisoner is constitutionally entitled to credit
against his sentence for time spent in jail awaiting trial.60
When this same issue arose again in Durkin v. Davis,61 the district
court was able to cite not three, but four unreported decisions,
because in the interim the Fourth Circuit had affirmed Mohr in an
unreported decision. 62 The Davis court paraphrased the language
of the district court in Mohr and decided the case on the basis of
the unreported decisions.63
B. Difficulty of Appeal
Decisions rendered under Fifth Circuit Rule 21, Eighth Circuit
Rule 14, and by order under District of Columbia Circuit Rule
13(c) do not create citation problems-there are no opinions to
-7 Marston v. Oliver, 485 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974).
58 370 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Md. 1974).
5 9 Id. at 1154. The court cited Sypolt v. Coiner, No. 73-1339 (4th Cir. June 27, 1973),
Steele v. North Carolina, 475 F.2d 1401 (4th Cir. 1973) (No. 72-2076), and Meadows v.
Coiner, 475 F.2d 1400 (4th Cir. 1973) (No. 73-1106).
60 370 F. Supp. at 1154.
61 390 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Va. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 538 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir.
1976).
62 No. 74-1496 (4th Cir. June 10, 1974).
63 390 F. Supp. at 254. Not all district courts within the Fourth Circuit agree as to the
weight to be accorded unreported decisions under Jones. See, for example, Anthony v.
Luther, 383 F. Supp. 827 (W.D.N.C. 1974), where the court easily distinguished an unre-
ported decision (Stubbs v. Turner, No. 66-11,425 (4th Cir. May 26, 1967)), but noted that
the circuit court had "insistently advised" against citing memoradum decisions. 383 F. Supp.
at 827. The extent of the problem of precedential value is impossible to determine because,
in addition to the Fourth Circuit, only the Tenth Circuit opens the courthouse door far
enough to permit counsel to bring unreported decisions before the bench.
[Vol. 63:128
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cite. Under these rules, judges write no opinions for unreported
cases.64 The decisions do, however, create problems on appeal, as
exemplified by Taylor v. McKeithen.65 The Fifth Circuit had re-
versed, without opinion, a district court decision invalidating the
1970 Louisiana reapportionment. After granting plaintiff's peti-
tion for certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded
"[b]ecause this record does not fully inform us of the precise na-
ture of the litigation and because we have not had the benefit of
the insight of the Court of Appeals. '66 The Court added in a foot-
note:
We, of course, agree that the courts of appeals should have wide
latitude in their decisions of whether or how to write opinions.
That is especially true with respect to summary affirmances....
But here the lower court summarily reversed without any opin-
ion on a point that had been considered at length by the District
Judge.6 7
Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the courts of appeals
have statutorily conferred powers to develop their own rules6 8 and,
in a given case, to issue a short opinion, or no opinion at all. 69 The
majority, he chided, "calls upon the Fifth Circuit to write an amicus
curiae opinion to aid us." °7 0 To show that lower court opinions,
although helpful, are not essential, 71 Justice Rehnquist cited Lego v.
Twomey, 72 which affirmed an unreported Seventh Circuit deci-
sion.7 3 Lego is clearly distinguishable, however, because the circuit
court had written an unpublished opinion which could have helped
explain the lower court's action to the Supreme Court. 4
64 See notes 9-14, 32, 35, and accompanying text supra.
65 407 U.S. 191 (1972).
66 Id. at 194.
67Id. at 194 n.4. Given the nature of the issue involved, the Fifth Circuit may have ig-
nored its own admonitions on the abuse of Local Rule 21. See text accompanying note 14
supra.
68 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970).
69 407 U.S. at 195.
70 Id. at 196.
71 1d. at 195.
7' 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
73 United States ex rel. Lego v. Pate, No. 69-18,813 (7th Cir. Oct. 8, 1970).
74 Moreover, Lego was an affirmance by the court of appeals, whereas Taylor was a
reversal. Indeed, the Court in Taylor indicated that wider latitude should be accorded the
lower court on the question of writing opinions where an affirmance is involved. See 407
U.S. at 194 n.4.
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C. Undetected and Unresolved Conflicts
Another danger in barring citation of unreported decisions is
that inconsistent results among panels within the same circuit will
not be discovered. Similarly, unreported cases within one circuit
may create an undetected conflict with another circuit. The un-
availability of unreported decisions can lead to a situation where
resolving these conflicts becomes impossible because of the "no
citation" rule.
The problem of internal inconsistencies came to the attention
of the Fourth Circuit in Jones v. Superintendent.75 The court stated:
"[A]lthough unmentioned, it should be clearly understood by the
bench and bar that any prior memorandum decision in conflict
with a subsequently published opinion is to be considered over-
ruled. ' 76 But when a decision is unreported, the law in question is
supposedly so well settled that it needs no further explanation.
How then can a court reverse itself on a point previously thought
settled without even examining the prior rationale?
In Matise v. American Foreign Steamship Co. ,7 the Ninth Circuit
construed a federal statute restricting the withholding of seamen's
wages. 78 It found that "the case law has, for at least two decades,
provided full notice ... that only those deductions from wages
that are allowed by statute are lawful. '79 Two months earlier the
law which had been clear "for at least two decades" caused great
difficulty for another panel of the Ninth Circuit in Gearin v.
Weyerhaeuser Line.8 0 That court found that the test for a shipowner
avoiding the statutory double-wage penalty was whether the "fail-
ure to pay [was] 'arbitrary, willful or unreasonable.' "81 Not only
did the Ninth Circuit's no-citation rule prohibit the Matise court
from discussing the Gearin opinion, 2 but the Matise court may not
75 465 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1972). See notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra.
76 465 F.2d at 1094. This provides no remedy for conflicts between unreported deci-
sions, or between a prior reported decision and a subsequent unreported one.
77 488 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 423 U.S. 150 (1975). See also
Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: Denial of Equal Justice?, 61 A.B.A.J. 1224
(1975).
78 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1970).
79 488 F.2d at 473. Finding the deductions not statutorily permitted, the court reversed
the district court and held the shipowner liable for the statutory double-wage penalty. Id.
80 No. 71-3026 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974).
81 Id., slip op. at 5 (quoting McCrea v. United States, 294 U.S. 23, 30 (1935)) (quoted in
Gardner, supra note 77, at 1225).
82 9TH CIR. R. 2 1(c) prohibits citation of unreported cases. The Supreme Court avoided
the problem presented by the conflicting Gearin and Matise opinions, finding that no de-
duction from wages had been made in the Matise case. 423 U.S. at 156-60.
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even have been aware of the Gearin decision. 83
Conflicts may also develop between two unreported decisions
without the courts or the bar becoming aware of them. Since,
under these circumstances, neither case is precedent, courts might
later "resolve" the problem. The courts of appeals, however, would
still benefit from having the reasoning of both opinions. This prob-
lem has troubled judges of the Seventh Circuit. In testimony be-
fore the Commission on the Revision of the Federal Court Appel-
late System,8 4 Judge Robert Sprecher encouraged the circuits to
compile an "intracourt index of unpublished opinions"8 5 so that
each circuit would be internally consistent. Such an index might be
made available to judges in order to avoid duplicative research, but
Judge Sprecher opposed using cases located through such an index
as precedent.8 6 This creates a dilemma. Without an index, unde-
tected intracircuit conflicts may go unresolved. But if the circuits
develop indexes to which only they can refer, they will be creating
a secret body of law which judges can apply, modify, or ignore as
they see fit. 87
D. Due Process and Equal Protection
Does a rule prohibiting citation of prior decisions to the court
affront the Constitution's due process requirement?88 The Fourth
Circuit briefly considered this issue in Jones v. Superintendent.8 9 In
the same paragraph the court dismissed any due process infirmity
" The possibility that an unpublished decision will conflict with an earlier published
decision, although less likely, is equally troublesome. In such a situation the parties to the
later case can seek review en banc or appeal to the Supreme Court. Should they fail to do
so, however, the existence of the conflict may be lost. A future litigant, seeking to overturn
the earlier published decision, will be unable to summon the later unpublished opinion to
his aid. Compare United States v. Holland, 510 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1975) (founded suspicion
for investigatory stop treated as question of law), with United States v. Alvarez-Garcia, No.
74-2789 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 1975) (founded suspicion treated as finding of fact), and United
States v. Johnson, No. 74-2552 (9th Cir. Mar. 12, 1975) (confusion as to whether founded
suspicion should be reviewed as finding of law or finding of fact).
84 The Commission was created by the Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86
Stat. 807, as amended by Act of Sept. 19, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-420, 88 Stat. 1153 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (Supp. V 1975)).
I' Hearings, vol. 1, supra note 3, at 536.
86M. at 536-39.
87 The Tenth Circuit prepares such an index. It makes the index available to anyone
because the circuit permits citation of unreported opinions. See 1976 Publication Plans Re-
port, supra note 5, at app. D (10th Cir.).
88 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
89 465 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1972). Jones is discussed in the text accompanying notes
46-47 supra.
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in a rule according no precedential value to unreported decisions,
and also found a right of unspecified origin to cite such cases to the
court. The Jones court noted "that any decision is by definition a
precedent, and.., we cannot deny litigants and the bar the right to
urge upon us what we have previously done."90 Such a right can be
derived only from the due process clause, but nowhere did the
court explain how or why that clause requires citation of, but not
reliance upon, unreported decisions.
Do-Right Auto Sales v. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit9' involved a constitutional challenge to the Seventh Circuit's
no-citation rule.92 Petitioners had attempted to cite an unreported
decision 93 of the Seventh Circuit in the proceeding below. 94 The
court struck the reference to the decision as required by Rule 35.
The petitioners alleged that the rule constitutes an unlawful prior
restraint on freedom of speech,95 and "impinges upon the.., right
to petition the government for redress of grievances," 96 carrying
''serious consequences for the fair and equal administration of
justice."97 Anticipating the argument that judicial efficiency jus-
tifies a no-citation rule, petitioners quoted Stanley v. Illinois:98
[T]he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and effi-
ciency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in gen-
eral, and the Due Process Clause ifi particular, that they were
designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry
from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that
may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and
perhaps more, than mediocre ones.99
90 465 F.2d at 1094 (emphasis added).
91 429 U.S. 917 (1976) (denial of motion for leave to file petition for writs of man-
damus and prohibition).
92 7TH CIR. R. 35(b)(2)(iv).
93 Valentino v. Lynch, No. 73-1089 (7th Cir. June 8, 1973). Plaintiffs moved to con-
vene a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970), and attempted to cite the
unreported decision in support of this motion.
94 Do-Right Auto Sales v. Flaum, No. 76-1022 (7th Cir. June 8, 1976). The initial case,
Do-Right Auto Sales v. Howlett, No. 75 C 2421 (N.D. Il1. Dec. 19, 1975), challenged the
constitutionality of ILL. REV. STAr. ch. 95 1/2, § 5-501(a)(5)-(6) (Supp. 1977). That statute
permits the Illinois Secretary of State to revoke auto dealer certificates without a hearing.
95 Petitioners' Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to File Petition for Writs of Man-
damus and Prohibition at 8, Do-Right Auto Sales v. United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, 429 U.S. 917 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Petitioners' Brief].
96 Id. at 8-9.
97 Id. at 9.
98 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
99 Petitioners' Brief, supra note 95, at 9 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 656).
Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (mandatory preference for men as adminis-
trators of estates unconstitutionally arbitrary legislative choice).
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Identifying the rights sacrificed in the name of speed and efficien-
cy, petitioners mixed equal protection and due process claims.' 00
The Seventh Circuit responded:
In the last analysis [petitioners'] case against the rule is grounded
in the doctrine of stare decisis which .... is a judicially-created
policy; it is not enshrined in the Constitution. Courts do modify
and overrule their prior decisions. By definition, therefore,
courts do have authority to determine whether a given decision
has value as a precedent for future cases, and, correspondingly,
whether it should be published to the world. 10 1
Although courts retain the power to overrule or modify their prior
decisions, why should they have the power to determine whether
such decisions should be available to other courts?
On November 1, 1976, the Supreme Court denied petitioners'
motion for leave to file a petition for writs of mandamus and
prohibition. 10 2 It therefore remains necessary to question whether
a no-citation rule may deny litigants due process of law.' 0 3
Justice Cardozo defined the rights protected by the due pro-
cess clause as those "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered
100 The petitioners cited Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), and Bouie
v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 476 (1964), for the proposition that availability and utiliza-
tion of prior written decisions are "essential to the stability of law." Petitioners' Brief, supra
note 95, at 9-10. Alleging a denial of equal protection, petitioners apparently relied on
erratic enforcement of the rule by citing Love v. Howlett, No. 75 C 1829 (N.D. Ill. June
13, 1975), in which the court allowed the plaintiffs to cite the unreported Valentino deci-
sion, and a three-judge court was convened.
101 Respondents' Brief in Opposition to Petitioners' Motion for Leave to File a Petition
for Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition at 25, Do-Right Auto Sales v. United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 429 U.S. 917 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Respondents'
Brief]. Respondents also argued that no continuing case or controversy existed because
petitioners had been granted a hearing before license revocation; the lack of a hearing had
been the basis of their initial claim. Id. at 10.
102 Do-Right Auto Sales v. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 429
U.S. 917 (1976). This denial should not reflect on the validity of petitioners' attack on the
Seventh Circuit rule. First, it is questionable whether a continuing case or controversy ex-
isted. See note 101 supra. Second, the Seventh Circuit rule was amended effective July 1,
1976, to permit any person to request that a previously unpublished order be certified as a
published opinion, with citation permitted. See 7TH CIR. R. 35. Third, the three-judge
court statute-the basis of petitioners' initial claim-was repealed effective August 12,
1976. Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119. This would not have
rendered petitioners' claim moot, but it might have affected the question of whether the
claim was substantial enough to warrant the Supreme Court's consideration.
103 The Supreme Court may reach this issue in United States ex rel. Browder v. Direc-
tor, 534 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1976) (mem.), cert. granted sub nom. Browder v. Director, 429
U.S. 1072 (1977). Petitioner in Browder challenges inter atia the authority of the Seventh
Circuit to decide cases without reported opinion pursuant to its Local Rule 35. Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 22-26.
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liberty,"' 0 4 the abridgement of which would violate "a 'principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental.' "105 Further, the due process clause
protects rights not explicitly enumerated by the Constitution if they
meet this definition.' 6 While respondents' point in Do-Right-that
the issue involved the constitutional status of stare decisis-seems
well taken, a cursory dismissal of stare decisis as "not enshrined in
the Constitution" will not suffice.
Although courts do not blindly adhere to earlier decisions,10 7
they do not casually modify and overrule them; courts carefully
consider the reasoning and underlying policies of prior deci-
sions.108 On one of the few occasions that the Supreme Court con-
sidered the status of stare decisis, Justice Frankfurter stated:
We recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social
policy. It represents an element of continuity in law, and is
rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations.
... [S]tare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical
formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and
questionable .... 109
To allow judicial sleight-of-hand to create a body of law exempt
from the doctrine would assault a rudimentary underpinning of
our legal system. Stare decisis is fundamental to our "scheme of
ordered liberty":
104 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
1 05Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
10 6 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
107See In re Estate of Eckart, 39 N.Y.2d 493, 498-99, 348 N.E.2d 905, 908, 384
N.Y.S.2d 429, 431-32 (1976); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951);
Baker v. Lorillard, 4 N.Y. 257, 261 (1850). Cf Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (Court
refused to overrule long-standing baseball antitrust exemption, although might have de-
cided differently if issue one of first impression).
08 See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649, 665-66 (1944). See also Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLM. L. REv. 735 (1949). In People
v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976), Chief Judge Breitel
noted: "At the root of [stare decisis] must be a humbling assumption, often true, that no
particular court as it is then constituted possesses a wisdom surpassing that of its predeces-
sors." Id. at 488, 348 N.E.2d at 901, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
109 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). A desire for stability in the law
encouraged reliance on decided cases as early as Bracton and the Yearbooks of the four-
teenth century. See Von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARV. L. REv.
409 (1924) (citing 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY iii (1909)). See also
D. CHAMBERLAIN, THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS: ITS REASONS AND ITS EXTENT 19
(1885).
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"From the very nature of law and its function in society, the
elements of certainty, stability, equality, and knowability are
necessary to its success, but reason and the power to advance
justice must always be its chief essentials; and the principal cause
for standing by precedent is not to be found in the inherent
probable virtue of a judicial decision, it 'is to be drawn from a
consideration of the nature and object of law itself, considered as
a system or a science.'"
The nub of the matter is that stare decisis does not spring
full-grown from a "precedent" but from precedents which reflect
principle and doctrine rationally evolved.... [T]here is potential
for jurisprudential scandal in a court which decides one way one
day and another way the next .... 10
Furthermore, if due process requires notice and opportunity
to be heard before judgment, 1 ' the opportunity to present "ever)'
available defense"' 1 2 must include the chance to cite unreported
decisions.
E. The No-Citation Rule Rejected
The consequences of the no-citation rule are simple. Counsel
cannot bring to the courts' attention relevant unpublished deci-
sions; the courts may not request either briefs or argument on
the applicability of earlier unpublished decisions. Furthermore,
appellate courts cannot even cite their own earlier unpublished
decisions.
Recognizing that unreported opinions can help the courts cope
with their dockets, the question remains whether courts should
grant these decisions precedential value and permit their cita-
110 People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 488, 348 N.E.2d 894, 900-01, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419,
425 (1976) (quoting Von Moschzisker, supra note 109, at 414) (citation omitted). Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas has also noted the fundamental nature of stare decisis:
[T]here will be no equal justice under law if a negligence rule is applied in the
morning but not in the afternoon. Stare decisis provides some moorings so that
men may trade and arrange their affairs with confidence. Stare decisis serves to
take the capricious element out of law and to give stability to a society.
Douglas, supra note 108, at 736. See also Von Moschzisker, supra note 109, at 430, which
notes: "This ancient custom of following precedents ... when properly . .. applied ...
helps us to hold fast to our basic principles, to establish knowable rules of conduct, to
administer even-handed justice, and to remain [sic] a uniformly consistent development of
our legal system."
"I See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
112 American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932) (emphasis added).
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tion. 113 An unreported decision may deal with a unique fact sit-
uation, more directly in point with a subsequent case than its re-
ported predecessors.' 1 4 Under the appropriate standards, unre-
ported decisions should make little or no new law, thereby
minimizing surprise to an opponent. Although unreported opin-
ions may not be prepared with the care or depth of analysis in-
volved in preparing reported opinions, judges can take account of
the shortcomings inherent in unreported decisions that are cited to
them. Further, free citation of unreported decisions will allow liti-
gants to bring to the courts' attention erroneous decisions not to
report.1" 5 In addition, courts will be able to request argument on
points raised by unreported decisions, thus ensuring that their de-
cisions are consistent with previously unreported cases. If inconsis-
tencies exist, courts can choose to distinguish, overrule, or limit the
prior unreported case. In short, free citation forces close consid-
eration-and reconsideration-of all decisions. Unrestrictive rules
best assure quality judicial decisions, reported and unreported.
CONCLUSION
The publication rules of the various circuits and the local rules
on unpublished opinions have helped federal courts keep pace
with ever-increasing caseloads." 6 The question remains, however,
whether this goal can be better served by a system which alleviates
the problems raised herein.
There should be uniformity among the circuits' rules for de-
ciding which cases should not be reported and what precedential
value should be accorded unreported decisions. Although courts
have recognized the value of experimentation,"' in this instance
1 The Advisory Committee on Procedures of the Judicial Council of the District of
Columbia Circuit has concluded that policy considerations favor permitting litigants to cite
unreported decisions. See Memorandum from John H. Pickering to the Judicial Council of
the D.C. Circuit (Dec. 6, 1976), reprinted in 1976 Publication Plans Report, supra note 5, at
app. D (D.C. Cir.).
114 See, e.g., Curley v. Bryan, 362 F. Supp. 48 (D.S.C. 1973), discussed in note 48 supra.
In theory-if not in fact-no court or attorney should ever need to cite an unre-
ported case. Indeed, the need to cite such a case indicates that its impact extends beyond
its facts, or that the fact pattern is a repeating one, and therefore, under the standards of
any of the circuits, the case should have been reported.
16 In 1975, 29% of all cases docketed in the courts of appeals were decided by pub-
lished opinion. See 1975 Publication Plans Report, supra note 2, at app. A. In 1976, the
figure was 27%. See 1976 Publication Plans Report, supra note 5, at app. A. See also Hast-
ings, The Seventh Circuit Plan for Publication of Opinions-A Continuing Experiment, 51 INn.
L.J. 367 (1976).
117 To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsi-
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long-term experimentation is not warranted. The various circuits
have had between three and seven years' experience in developing
standards and procedures related to unreported decisions.
Uniform rules would discourage "circuit shopping" by a liti-
gant who wishes to cite an unreported decision in a given appeal.
Uniformity would also avoid a conflict of rules problem between
the circuits.'"8 Today, each circuit court can only promulgate rules
for use within its own circuit, but cannot bind other circuits. It
remains unclear which rule governs: the rule of the circuit that
issued the opinion or the rule of the circuit to which it is cited. 119
Uniform national standards can best resolve this problem. The
Supreme Court has authority under the Rules Enabling Act 12 0 to
"prescribe by general rules . . .the practice and procedure of the
• ..courts of appeals."'121 Within this power clearly lies the Su-
preme Court's authority to promulgate uniform rules regarding
publication of opinions and citation of unreported decisions. The
time has.come for adoption of a uniform national policy.
To this author, the standards of the Ninth Circuit,122 the most
explicit in indicating which cases are appropriate for disposition
by unreported decisions, can best achieve the goals of uniformity
and consistency of application. As to the citation of unreported
decisions, the Tenth Circuit rule, 123 which freely permits such
citation but minimizes surprise to opposing counsel, is preferable
bility. . . . It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments . . . .This Court has the power to prevent an
experiment... because [of] the due process clause ....
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (dissenting opinion, Brandeis, J.).
118 For example, the Seventh Circuit bars citation of unreported decisions and the
Tenth Circuit permits it. Which rule governs when an attorney wishes to cite a Tenth
Circuit opinion to the Seventh Circuit? Which rule governs the citation of a Seventh Cir-
cuit opinion to the Tenth Circuit?
119 Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19 (1975) (per curiam), represents the Supreme Court's
first recognition of a circuit no-citation rule. In reaction to the majority's citation of two
Sixth Circuit unreported decisions (id. at 21 n.3), Justice Brennan questioned whether the
Supreme Court is not "called upon to respect" the circuit's no-citation rule. Id. at 23-24 n.2
(dissenting opinion). See Hastings, supra note 116, at 372-73. Justice Brennan premised his
dissent on the theory that the majority's interpretation of the lower court opinion could
not be read consistently with two earlier unreported decisions of the same Sixth Circuit.
423 U.S. at 23-24 n.2. There is, however, no reason to believe that the lower court was
even aware of its earlier unreported decisions or the need to harmonize them with Rose.
120 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
121 Id.
122 9TH CIR. R. 2 1(a). See notes 17-24 and accompanying text supra.
123 10TH CIR. R. 17(c). See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
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to the Seventh Circuit's cumbersome procedure.12 4 These stan-
dards would permit unreported decisions to aid significantly judi-
cial efficiency without imperiling the rights of litigants or the doc-
trine of stare decisis.
David Dunn
124 7TH CIR. R. 35(b)(2)(iv). See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
